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ABSTRACT 
This paper provides empirical evidence on the effectiveness of 
movements in nominal exchange rates in smoothing cyclical imbalances 
between countries, as explained by the literature on optimal currency 
areas . We use restrictions from the Mundell-Flemming model (on which the 
theory of optimal currency areas is based) to identify V AR systems that 
explain the exchange rate movements and the relative output movements 
of potential members of a European Monetary Union (EMU). We find that 
the shocks that cause most of the variation in relative output do not seem 
to result in movements in nominal exchange rates. Moreover, the shocks 
that explain movements in nominal exchange rates are monetary in nature, 
rather than real. Such results make it hard to argue that the loss of 
exchange rate flexibility accompanying EMU would come at a significant 
cost to macroeconomic stability. 

1. INTRODUCTION 
The Maastricht Treaty calls for a European Monetary Union (EMU) 
by the end of the decade. Given the political and economic significance of 
the changes envisaged in the treaty, it is not surprising that there has 
been -- and still is -- a heated debate in both academic and political circles 
about the economic desirability of EMU . 
Much of the debate is focused on the potential cost of losing of the 
nominal exchange rate as a tool for macroeconomic stabilization. In 
particular, it has been argued that the nominal exchange rate can be an 
effective instrument for addressing international macroeconomic 
imbalances. The logic -- which goes back to Mundell's (1961) theory of 
optimal currency areas -- runs as follows: Suppose demand shifts away 
from the product of country A, and over to the product of country B. If 
labor is not mobile between countries, and if wages and prices are slow to 
adjust, then unemployment will develop in country A and inflationary 
expectations will build up in country B. If however exchange rates are 
free to adjust -- even within a limited range -- then there are two forces 
that may be expected to address the imbalance. First, market pressures 
will automatically mOVe the nominal exchange rate in a way that helps the 
relative product price adjust, absorbing some of the effect of this 
"asymmetricll shock. And second, a counter cyclical monetary policy can 
be implemented in each country. Critics of EMU argue that both of these 
forces would be lost if the two countries were to form a monetary union. 
Most of the existing empirical work on the potential costs of EMU 
tries to assess the importance of asymmetric shocks within the European 
Union. 1 ("Symmetric" shocks -- shocks that have a similar impact across 
countries -- do not require a relative price adjustment; they are not 
relevant for the issue at hand). A standard approach has been to compare 
the variability of real exchange rates within Europe with the variability of 
relative prices across regions within a given country, such as the United 
States; the European real exchange rates are generally found to be more 
variable.' Eichengreen (1991) has noted however that this approach does 
not distinguish between the size of a shock and the ability of a given 
economy to cope with it. 1 Furthermore, according to the theory, the 
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response of the real exchange rate to a given shock depends on the 
exchange regime that is in place. These considerations led Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1993) (and others) to look for a more direct way to measure 
the s.ize and symmetry of regional shocks . 4 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen used VAR techniques developed by 
Blanchard and Quah (1989) to identify shocks for countries in Europe and 
for regions within the US. They found that "only if the EC core is 
compared with the entire US . . .  is the magnitude and coherence of 
aggregate supply and demand disturbances -comparable" . They thus 
conclude that " Germany and its immediate EC neighbors (the EC core) 
come much closer than the Community as a whole to representing a 
workable monetary union along American lines". The implication seems to 
be that a narrow EMU would function satisfactorily, but that a wider EMU 
would experience large asymmetric shocks , leading to serious international 
imbalances, and perhaps to pressures on the newly created European 
System of Central Banks to adopt an excessively accommodating monetary 
stance, thereby endangering price stability . 
This is probably a fair summary of the consensus view, a view that 
can be gleaned from a large number of empirical studies that have tried to 
assess the potential costs of EMU. However, we think that the literature 
has left two important gaps in the argument, and that the consensus it has 
reached may therefore be premature. In particular, the literature has not 
distinguished between real and monetary shocks, 5 and it has not asked 
whether nominal exchange rates actually move in response to the shocks 
that cause international macroeconomic imbalances . 
The theory of optimal currency areas suggests that it is important 
to distinguish between real and monetary shocks . Flexible exchange rates 
are preferable (on grounds of macroeconomic stability) for aggregate 
supply and non-monetary demand shocks (henceforth 'demand' shocks) , 
while a common currency (or a system of fixed rates) is preferable for 
money and financial market shocks . 6 Relative velocity shifts, misguided 
national monetary policy innovations, time varying risk premia and 
speculative currency attacks are examples of asymmetric shocks that could 
(in theory) cause macroeconomic imbalances under flexible rates, but 
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would simply go away after a monetary union was formed. A group of 
countries that were experiencing asymmetric shocks of this type would be 
good candidates for a monetary union. An empirical assessment of the 
costs and benefits of EMU should try to differentiate between shocks to 
aggregate supply or demand on the one hand , and shocks to money and 
financial markets on the other. 
Even if it were determined that goods market shocks are causing 
most of the international macroeconomic imbalances, it would still be 
necessary to verify that nominal exchange rates are actually moving to 
address the imbalances before concluding that EMU would be costly. The 
alternative hypothesis we have in mind can be stated as follows: 
The Asset Price Hypothesis: The exchange rate acts primarily as an asset 
price in the financial markets. It responds to shocks that are not directly 
related to the macroeconomic imbalances. It is not the shock absorber for 
goods market disturbances that has been described by the theory of 
optimal currency areas. 
Indeed, the real exchange rate volatility that has been documented in the 
literature may be entirely unrelated to the asymmetric shocks that cause 
international macroeconomic imbalances. If this were the case, then EMU 
would bring no additional costs. Asymmetric shocks might be causing 
significant macroeconomic imbalances, but nominal exchange rates would 
not be moving to address them. This issue seems to have received very 
little attention in the empirical literature.1 
In this paper, we seek the answers to two specific questions. 
Question 1 :  Among potential EMU participants, can most of the variation 
in nominal exchange rates be explained by the same shocks 
that explain the movements in relative national outputs? 
Question 2: Among potential EMU participants ,  can much of the variation 
in the relative national outputs be explained by money and 
financial market shocks (as opposed to aggregate supply and 
demand shocks) ? 
- 7 -
The theory of optimal currency areas suggests that we would need a 
positive answer to the first question, and a negative answer to the second, 
before we co;uld conclude that EMU would be costly to the macroeconomic 
stability of its members . 
In order to proceed, we need some way of identifying shocks. Like 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen, we will use the VAR techniques developed by 
Blanchard and Quah (1989). Question 1 is not -- on the surface anyway -­
very demanding in this regard; all it requires is a well defined 
classification of the shocks that move nominal exchange rates and relative 
national outputs. This classification does not have to correspond to the 
definition of shocks in any particular theory or model of exchange rate 
determination .  Question 2 is more demanding. It requires us to identify 
money and financial market shocks, and to separate their effects on 
exchange rates and relative outputs from those of aggregate supply and 
demand shocks . This has to be done within the context of the Mundell­
Flemming model, since it provides the theoretical foundation for the theory 
of optimal currency areas. 8 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we 
provide an answer to Question 1 using the simplest VAR possible and what 
we think is a very natural classification of shocks. The V AR has only two 
variables: the exchange rate ahd the ratio of the national outputs of the 
two countries in question. Shocks are classified as "neutral" if they have 
no long run effect on relative output, and as "non-neutral" if they do. 
These VARs provide some useful insights, but it turns out that their 
simplicity and generality is both a strength and a weakness . The variance 
decompositions from these V ARs can be interpreted in several ways, some 
of which are favorable to EMU and some of which are not. To differentiate 
between the competing interpretations, and to get an answer to Question 
2, we need a classification of shocks that corresponds more closely to the 
shocks defined by the Mundell-Flemming model . More specifically, we need 
to identify what we will call the "money and financial markets" shock, and 
to set it apart from the "goods market" (aggregate supply and demand) 
shocks . 
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In Section III, we begin by reviewing the short run implications of 
the Mundell-Fleming model; these short run implications can be used as 
overidentifying restrictions on the impulse response functions to test our 
interpretation of the shocks in the VARs . It turns out that the impulse 
response functions of the VARs presented in Section II are rather 
uninformative; they do not confirm or deny that our initial classification 
of shocks -- as either neutral or non-neutral -- can be interpreted as a 
separation of the money and financial markets shock from the goods market 
shocks . We go on to specify several 3-variable VAR systems that might 
produce the desired classification of shocks. In Section IV, we present the 
most successful of these. We look at bilateral relationships between 
Germany and six European countries. We also look at bilateral relationships 
between periphery countries and a "core", using several different 
aggregations to define the core. In Section V, we summarize our results, 
and relate them to the recent empirical literature. Finally, in Section VI, 
we draw important policy conclusions from our analysis . We focus in 
particular on the economic viability of a European monetary union that 
extends beyond a small group of core countries. 
II. A NATURAL AND PARSIMONIOUS APPROACH TO QUESTION 1 
To answer either Question 1 or Question 2 we need a procedure that 
will allow us to classify shocks and assess their impact on the variables of 
interest . One method of doing this was developed by Blanchard and Quah 
(1989). and later extended by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) and by 
Clarida and Gall (1994). The method consists of imposing long run 
identifying restrictions on a VAR model that captures the relevant 
economic interactions, here the short run effects of the various shocks on 
relative national outputs and nominal exchange rates. The identifying 
restrictions have to come from economic theory. Once the V ARs are 
estimated, variance decompositions will us tell how much of the variation 
in each variable can be attributed to each of the shocks. 
We begin with the most parsimonious V AR possible. given the 
questions that have to be addressed; it includes only the two variables of 
interest -- the nominal exchange rate and the ratio of the national outputs 
- 9 -
of the two countries in question. And we choose what would appear to be 
the most natural long run identifying restriction, given the two variables 
in the system: all shocks are classified as being either "neutral" or "non­
neutral", depending on whether they have a long run affect on relative 
output . This classification of shocks is consistent with a wide range of 
macroeconomic theories ,  although the interpretation of which category a 
given shock might fall into may differ from one model to another. For 
example, monetary shocks are neutral (in the long run) in virtually all 
modern macroeconomic models, but government spending shocks are 
neutral (in the long run) in most Keynesian models and non-neutral in 
some endogenous growth models. (We discuss the classification of shocks 
in the Mundell-Flemming model at some length in the next section.) This 
generality is both a strength and a weakness . The variance decompositions 
that come from these simple VARs can have a more than one interpretation, 
and this will lead us to some difficulties in the end. 
Identifying and Estimating the 2-variable V ARs --
The log of the nominal exchange rate (e) and the log of the ratio of 
national outputs (y) are the two variables in the system. Using first 
differences (for stationarity) , we start by assuming that the vector .6.x1 = 
[Aet, AYt] I has a structural interpretation given by: 
(1) <l.x, = C(L)e" 
where L is the lag operator and Et = [Ent, Ept] t is a vector of structural 
shocks; Enl is the neutral shock and Ept is the non-neutral (or permanent) 
shock. Et is serially uncorrelated and has a variance-covariance matrix 
normalized to the identity matrix. 
The vector of structural shocks, E" is not observed directly. The 
trick is to recover Et from an estimate of the moving average 
representation: 
(2) <l.x, = A(L)u" 
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where the first matrix in the polynomial A(L) is the identity matrix, and 
the disturbance vector ut has an estimated variance-covariance matrix r.. 
Equations (1) and (2) imply a linear relationship between Et and Ut! 
(3) u, = C,E,. 
We have to pin down the 2x2 matrix Co to be able to recover the vector of 
structural shocks, Ep from the estimated disturbance vector, ut• 
Observing that the symmetric matrix L = CoCo' imposes three of the four 
restrictions that are required, we need one more identifying restriction .  
Let C(I) = C, + C, + . . •  be the long run effect of E, on .:I.", coming 
from the structural form (1) . Blanchard and Quah (1989) suggest that we 
use economic theory to impose the final restriction on C (1).  Then, we can 
work our way back to Co' 
The long run representation of (1) can be written as: 
The long run identifying restriction is ClI (1) = 0; that is, the neutral 
shock has no long run effect on relative output . This restriction makes the 
matrix C(1) upper triangular, and we can use this fact to recover Co . 
Equating (1) and (2) (in their long run form) and using (3), we see that 
A(1) = C(1)C,'. A Cholesky decomposition of A(1)};A(1)' gives the C(1) 
matrix. And finally, C, = A(1)"'C(I). This gives us the matrix we need in 
(3) to calculate the unobserved structural shocks. The long run 
restriction on C(1) fully identifies the VAR and its structural shocks . We 
are ready to estimate the two-variable VARs. 
Here, we look at bilateral relationships between Germany and six of 
its potential EMU partners: we consider Germany vis-a-vis Austria, The 
Netherlands, France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom . While our 
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sample does not include all 15 of the current EU Member States, it is 
nevertheless quite representative for our purposes . It contains what are 
generally thought of as core countries and periphery countries; it contains 
large and small countries j and it contains countries with different degrees 
of openness and (possibly) different economic structures . 
We use quarterly data from the DEC D's Main Economic Indicators: 
cross country differences in the log of real GDP for relative output and 
the log of quarterly averages for the exchange rate . The data runs from 
1970: 1 to 1985:4. This is the period between the end of the Bretton Woods 
System and the hardening of the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the EMS; we 
take it to be a period of flexible exchange rates (though we will see that 
this assumption is questionable in the cases of Austria and the 
Netherlands).  For each bilateral relationship, we estimated a VAR in .6.e 
and Ay; standard stationarity tests (Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron) 
supported the use of first differencing. 9 The VARs include a constant and 
four lags. 
Variance Decompositions for the 2-variable V ARs --
Tables 1 and 2 show average variance decompositions at different 
forecast horizons. They also report (in parentheses) the standard 
deviations at each forecast step . These were obtained from a Monte Carlo 
exercise of 100 draws from the posterior distribution of the estimated 
VAR. 
Table 1 shows the variance decompositions for relative output. 
Several interesting results emerge from it . First, in all of the bilateral 
relationships, and at all of the time horizons, the most important shock by 
far is the non-neutral shock, Ep' For our purposes here, we are most 
interested in horizons of one or at most two years; this is the horizon over 
which monetary policy and exchange rate flexibility are presumed to be 
most potent. Reading across the table, the non-neutral shock explains 
over 90% of the variation in relative output after one year (or four 
quarters), and over 95% of the variation after two years; for Spain, the 
numbers are slightly lower. Put alternatively, the neutral shock, ED' has 
very little to do with the short run fluctuations in relative national 
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outputs; it can only explain 5% to 10% of the variation at horizons of one to 
two years . 
The results of Table 1 allow us to state Question 1 more precisely: 
can much of the variation in exchange rates be explained by the non­
neutral shock, Ep' which explains virtually all of the variation in relative 
national outputs? Table 2 suggests that the countries fall into two or 
three groups: For Austria, the Netherlands and France, the non-neutral 
shock explains 10-15% of the variation in exchange rates at horizons of one 
to two years; for Spain and the UK, it explains 15-20% of the variation; 
and for Italy, it explains about 40% of the variation. 
So, what then is the answer to Question 1? The methodology we 
employ does not allow an explicit statistical inference; conclusions are 
necessarily impressionistic. This is the way we read the results: For 
Austl'ia, the Netherlands, France, Spain and the UK as well, the shock 
that explains about 90-95% of variation of relative national outputs explains 
less (and in some cases much less) than 20% of the variation in nominal 
exchange rates . The nominal exchange rate is not moving much in 
response to the shocks that are causing virtually all of the international 
macroeconomic imbalances . It would probably not be costly in terms of 
macro-economic stability for any of these countries to join a monetary 
union with Germany, though the case is stronger for Austria, the 
Netherlands and France than it is for Spain and the UK . For Italy, the 
shock that explains most of the variation in relative output (more than 90%) 
also explains a significant proportion (40%) of the variation in exchange 
rate; for Italy, the costs of EMU may well be significant. 
Further Interpretation and Some Caveats --
Figures 1 through 4 show the impulse response functions from the 
2-variable VARs, along with two standard deviation confidence intervals . 
We will discuss these graphs in some detail in the next section. However, 
it is worth noting here that neither of the shocks has a very large effect 
on the nominal exchange rate in the cases of Austria and the Netherlands. 
Even in the period we are considering -- 1970 to 1985 -- these countries 
were maintaining a fairly tight peg to the DM; in effect, they already had 
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something approaching a monetary union. The data and the variance 
decompositions for these countries may therefore be rather uninformative 
for our purposes. 
We quickly run into difficulty if we try to push the interpretation of 
these variance decompositions much further . In particular, it matters 
critically whether we think that the neutral shock, En' is composed 
primarily of money and financial market shocks, or of shocks to aggregate 
supply and demand. 
If we think the neutral shock reflects money and financial market 
shocks then we have support for the Asset Price Hypothesis put forward 
in the introduction. The real exchange rate volatility that has been 
documented across countries in Europe was caused by money and financial 
market disturbances; it is not an indication that flexible rates are needed 
to smooth international macroeconomic imbalances. In addition, we have an 
answer to Question 2. The (relative) money and financial market shocks 
that would be eliminated by the formation of a currency union were not 
being transmitted to the goods markets; these countries should not expect 
a substantial stabilization gain from EMU. 
On the other hand, if we think that the neutral shock reflects 
aggregate supply and demand disturbances, then a critic of EMU could 
give the variance decompositions a much less sanguine interpretation: it 
might be argued that nominal exchange rates were so effective at 
absorbing these shocks that they were not allowed to destabilize relative 
outputs to any measurable degree. We are somewhat skeptical of this 
extreme interpretation, and the literature on optimal currency areas does 
not explain why exchange rates should absorb some goods market shocks 
and not others. Nevertheless, this interpretation can not be ruled out on 
the basis of the VARs presented here. 
If progress were to be made on these issues, we would need to find 
a VAR system with a classification of shocks that is more consistent with 
the Mundell-Flemming model. We turn to that in the next section. 
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III. IDENTIFYING SHOCKS IN THE MUNDELL-FLEMMING MODEL 
The Mundell-Flemming model provides the theoretical foundation for 
the theory of optimal currency areas . First, we review its implications for 
the behavior of relative outputs , the nominal exchange rate, relative 
product prices, and the real exchange rate. Then, we look at impulse 
response functions of the VARs presented in the last section to see if the 
neutral shock can be interpreted as a money and financial markets shock . 
Finally, we discuss ways in which 3-variable VARs might be identified to 
produce a classification of shocks that is more consistent with the Mundell­
Flemming model; we suggest three different VAR structures . 
Implications of the Mundell-Flemming Model n 
The key assumptions of the Mundell-Flemming model are: (1) sticky 
price and output adjustment, and (2) national outputs that are imperfect 
substitutes in consumption . The real exchange rate is the relative price 
of two countries' products. Clarida and Gali (1994) provide an exposition 
of the model that is well suited to our purposes; here, we will just 
summarize the results that are of interest to us . 10 
First, it should be emphasized that we are only interested in 
"asymmetric" or relative shocks . Common or "symmetric" shocks do not 
require any adjustment in the real exchange rate, and are therefore not 
part of the optimal currency area argument. The shocks in the Mundell­
Flemming model can be put into three categories: "money and financial 
markets" shocks , Er; "aggregate demand" shocks, Ed; and "aggregate 
supply" shocks, E. . Sometimes we refer to the last two collectively as 
"goods market" shocks. Ershocks include changes in the ratio of home and 
foreign money supplies, relative velocity shifts, and such things as time 
varying risk premia (or more generally, speculative currency attacks) . 
Ed shocks are relative absorption shocks , such as a change in the ratio of 
home to foreign government spending . E, shocks are relative supply 
shocks , such as a change in the ratio of home to foreign productivity. 
The modePs implications for these shocks can be summarized as 
follows: 
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Ed: A positive relative absorption shock creates an excess demand for 
home output relative to foreign output. In the short run, both real 
and nominal exchange rates appreciate, the relative product price 
rises, and relative output increases; in the long run, relative 
output returns to its full employment level and the real exchange 
rate appreciates if the shock is permanent. 
E,: A positive relative supply shock creates an excess supply for home 
output relative to foreign output. In the short run, both real and 
nominal exchange rates depreciate, the relative product price falls, 
and relative output increases; in the long run, relative output goes 
to a higher full employment level and the real exchange rate 
depreciates if the shock is permanent (as suggested by most of the 
real business cycle literature) . 
Er: A positive relative money or financial markets shock lowers the home 
interest rate relative to the foreign interest rate. In the short run, 
both real and nominal exchange rates depreciate, the relative 
product price rises, and relative output increases; in the long run, 
relative output returns to its full employment level, and there is no 
effect on the real exchange rate. 
Interpretation of the Neutral Shock in the 2-variable VARs --
The 2-variable VARs presented in the last section were identified by 
a single long run restriction: the neutral shock has no effect on output. 
This is the only restriction that was imposed on the data. We can use the 
results outlined above as "overidentifying" restrictions to interpret the 
neutral shock in terms of the Mundell-Flemming model. In particular, if 
over the sample period ED was primarily a positive (negative) money and 
financial markets shock, then it should have depreciated (appreciated) the 
exchange rate and expanded (decreased) relative output in the short run. 
On the other hand, if ED was primarily a positive (negative) aggregate 
demand shock, then it should have appreciated (depreciated) the 
exchange rate and increased (decreased) relative output in the short run. 
We can use the impulse response functions from the V ARs to test these 
overidentifying restrictions. 
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Figure 1 shows the exchange rate impulse response functions for the 
neutral shock, along with their two standard deviation confidence 
intervals. In each case, En causes a significant depreciation. Figure 3 
shows the impulse response functions for relative output. In some cases, 
En appears to increase relative output, which (when coupled with the 
exchange rate's depreciation) suggests a positive money and financial 
markets shock; in others, En appears to decrease relative output, which 
(when coupled with the exchange rate's depreciation) suggests a negative 
aggregate demand shock. In no case however is the response more than 
marginally significant. Our tests of the overidentifying restrictions are 
basically inconclusive. Our confidence in the labeling of the two shocks 
has to ride on our belief in the long run restrictions that were used to 
identify the VARs in the first place, and here we have a problem. In the 
Mundell-Flemming model, both the money and financial markets shock and 
the aggregate demand shock are generally thought to be neutral in the 
long run; they both look like our neutral shock, En' 
This means that the 2-variable VARs -- while capable of providing 
an answer to Question 1 -- are open to conflicting interpretations J as 
suggested at the end of the last section. Some other identification 
procedure might produce a separation between money and financial 
markets shocks and goods market shocks, but we do not know what that 
identification procedure might be. Reluctantly, we conclude that the 
parsimonious 2-variable VARs will not suffice. To identify all three of the 
shocks in the Mundell-Flemming model, using the Blanchard Quah (1989) 
methodology, we need to go on to 3-variable VARs. 
Identifying 3-variable VARs --
If we could observe Ed directly, then we could work with the three 
dimensional vector A� = [4e" 4EdI, AYe]'. Edl is however an unobserved 
combination of aggregate demand shocks. Our first approach is to choose 
an important source of aggregate demand shocks and hope that it is a good 
proxy for Ed' 
Letting g, be the (log of the) ratio of government spending in the 
two countries, we set AXt = [Ae" Age' AYI],.
II Following the procedure 
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outlined in the last section, we now need three long run identifying 
restrictions. We assume that neither the money and financial markets shock 
nor the government spending shock has a long run effect on output; 
furthermore, we assume that the money and financial markets shock has 
no long run effect on government spending: 
Ae, CII (1) Cu{1 ) Cil(1) Eft 
(5) Ag, 0 C21{l) C,,{l) E" . 
Ay, 0 0 C" (I) E. 
This 3-variable VAR is fully identified. We will present variance 
decompositions from it in the next section , and we will look at the impulse 
response functions to see if the 3-variable V AR does a better job of 
separating the money and financial markets shock from the goods market 
shocks than the 2-variable system . 
We also looked at two other 3-variable systems . One is inspired by 
Clarida and Gall (1994) . Letting p, be the (log of the) relative product 
price (so that el + PI is the real exchange rate), we set .6.xt = [.6.ep apt' 
Ay,]' . Following Clarida and Gall, the long run identifying restrictions are 
that neither the money and financial markets shock nor the aggregate 
demand shock has an effect on output, and that the money and financial 
markets shock does not have an effect on the real exchange rate: 
(6) 
o o C,,{l) E. 
The last V AR system we identify is in a sense analogous to the first; 
it uses a proxy for the money and financial markets shock instead of the 
aggregate demand shock. Letting v, be the (log of the) ratio of velocities 
in the two countries, we set Ax, = [Ae" Av" Ay,]'. The long run identifying 
restrictions are that neither the velocity shock nor the aggregate demand 
shock has an effect on output, and that the demand shock does not have 
an effect on velocity: 
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(7) lJ.v, o 
o 
Cn(l) Cn(1) e. 
o Cn(1) e. 
IV. ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS 1 lie 2 FROM A 3-VARIABLE SYSTEM 
Three different VAR systems were identified in the last section . The 
first -- the one with aXt = [.6.ep 4gn 4y,] I -- seems to have performed the 
best . 12 We focus on it in this section. We will return to the problem of 
identification at the end of the section. 
Bilateral Relationships with Germany --
We look at the same bilateral relationships as before; that is, we look 
at Germany vis-a-vis Austria, The Netherlands, France J Italy, Spain and 
the United Kingdom . And as before, we use quarterly data from the 
DEeD's Main Economic Indicators: cross country differences in the log of 
real GDP for relative output; the log of quarterly averages for the 
exchange rate; and cross country differences in the log real government 
consumption for relative government spending. The data runs from 1970: 1 
to 1985:4 . The VARs include a constant and four lags . 
Tables 3 and 4 show average variance decompositions at different 
forecast horizons for the two variables of interest: relative output and the 
exchan.ge rate. They also report the standard errors at each forecast 
step. These were obtained from a Monte Carlo exercise of 100 draws from 
the posterior distribution of the estimated VAR. 
Table 3 shows the variance decompositions for relative national 
outputs . In all of the bilateral relationships, and at all of the time 
horizons, the most important shock by far is the relative supply shock, Eli' 
As before, we are most interested in horizons of one or at most two years. 
Reading across the table, relative supply shocks explain 71-86% of the 
variation in relative output after one year (or four quarters), and 81-92% 
of the variation after two years. By contrast, almost none of the variation 
in relative output is explained by the money and financial markets shock, 
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Ef' Reading across the table, this shock explains only 4-10% of the 
variation after one year, and only 2-6% after two years. 
This provides a clear answer to Question 2. For any one of these 
countries, eliminating the money and financial markets shock (by entering 
into a monetary union with Germany) would be expected to reduce 
macroeconomic imbalances with Germany by at most 5-10%. These 
imbalances seem to be explained almost entirely by the shocks to aggregate 
supply and demand \3 • 
Moreover, the results of Table 3 allow us to state Question 1 more 
precisely: can most of the variation in exchange rates be explained by the 
shocks to aggregate supply and demand, which collectively explain more 
than 90% of the variation in relative national outputs? Table 4 suggests 
that (even after excluding Italy) the answer is more ambiguous here than 
was with the 2-variable VARs. Excluding Italy, shocks to aggregate 
supply and demand explain 19-33% of the variation in exchange rates after 
one year, and 31-41% after two years. 
While the evidence presented in Tables 3 and 4 is much weaker than 
in Tables 1 and 2, it may still be the case that (with the exception of Italy) 
it would not be costly for any one of the countries considered to enter into 
a monetary union with Germany. The decisions that have to be made by the 
end of the decade are however more complicated than that. If EMU comes 
about, it will most likely consist of a subset, or core, of the EU member 
states. The relevant issue will be which, if any, of the countries on the 
periphery should be admitted. With this in mind, we define cores of 
various sizes, and look at bilateral relationships between periphery 
countries and the core. 
Bilateral Relationships with the Core --
The smallest core we consider -- CORE 1 -- consists of Germany, 
Austria and the Netherlands. 14 This is a natural choice since these 
countries already have a de facto monetary union that severely limits 
exchange rate movements, even in our sample period. This is evident from 
the impulse response functions pictured in Figures 5, 6 and 7; none of the 
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shocks produce a very large exchange rate response in these countries. 
As mentioned in Section II, the variance decompositions for Austria and 
the Netherlands may not be very informative for our purposes. 
As before, the VARs include (logged changes in) the exchange rate, 
relative government consumption, and relative output. Core output and 
core government consumption are the sums of the individual member 
country variables, using 1990 PPP weights; core exchange rates are 
effective nominal exchange rates, using real GDP (in PPP terms) as 
weights. 
Table 5 shows the variance decompositions from these VARs. The 
money and financial markets shock, EfJ explains very little of the variation 
in relative output -- only 4-8% after one year and 2-4% after two. And, 
excluding Italy, the shocks that explain most of the variation in relative 
output, Eg and E" explain relatively little of variation in exchange rates -
- only 20-25% after one year and 25-30% after two. In the case of Italy. 
however, Eg and E, do explain almost 40% of the variation in exchange rates 
at both horizons. Here, it is interesting to note, the results are stronger 
than they were in bilateral relationships with Germany, and almost as 
strong as they were with the 2-variable VARs. With the possible exception 
of Italy. it seems that any one of the countries could join CORE 1 at low 
cost. 
Does it continue to make sense for periphery countries to join as we 
sequentially add more countries to the union? CORE 2 adds France to the 
union. and then CORE 3 adds Spain. Tables 6 and 7 report the variance 
decompositions from the corresponding V ARs. The basic message does not 
change, and once again the results are much stronger than they were in 
the original bilateral relationships with Germany (Tables 3 and 4). With 
the possible exception of Italy, it seems that any of the periphery 
countries could join the union at low cost. 
The variance decompositions from the bilateral relationships with 
any of the cores (Tables 5. 6 and 7) seem quite consistent with the 
variance decompositions from the 2-variable VARs (Tables 1 and 2). 
Results from the 3-variable bilateral relationships with Germany are more 
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ambiguous, We are not sure why. However, we have already noted that the 
Austrian and Dutch exchange rate impulse response functions do not show 
a large response for any of the shocks. These countries have in effect 
already formed a monetary union with Germany, and it probably makes 
sense to think of Germany, Austria and the Netherlands as a single unit 
for our purposes. 
Testing the Overidentifying Restrictions --
So far J we have just taken our identification of the three shocks -­
EfJ Ed' and E. -- for granted. However, we can once again use the short 
run implications of the Mundell-Flemming model as overidentifying 
restrictions, and we can see if the 3-variable V ARs do a better job of 
identifying the money and financial markets shock, and setting it apart 
from the goods market shocks, than the 2-variable VARs. 
Figures 5 through 7 show the impulse response functions for the 
exchange rate, and their two standard deviation confidence intervals. In 
each case, Ef causes a significant depreciation in the short run, If Er is 
indeed a money and financial markets shock, then it should also increase 
relative output in the short run. Figures 8 through 10 show the impulse 
response functions for relative output. In some cases Ef causes relative 
output to rise while in others it causes relative output to fall, but in no 
case does the response appear to be significant. The results are similarly 
inconclusive for the other two shocks. In each case, E. causes a significant 
increase in relative output. If E. is indeed a supply shock, then it should 
cause the exchange rate to depreciate, However, the exchange rate 
response is insignificant in five of the six cases; for Italy, it appears to 
cause a significant depreciation, at least in the very short run. And 
finally, in each case Ed causes insignificant responses in both relative 
output and the nominal exchange rate. 
There is some evidence in these figures that Ef is indeed a pure 
money and financial markets shock, and that it is not contaminated by 
demand shocks that were not included in Ed' In all cases, Er causes a 
s�gnificant depreciation, and in all cases Ed has an insignificant effect on 
the exchange rate. There can be no doubt that Ed itself is an aggregate 
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demand shock; government spending is an important component of 
aggregate demand. If shocks to the other components of aggregate demand 
have a similarly insignificant effect on the exchange rate, then the 
significant depreciations we attribute to Er suggest that another shock -­
ie. the money and financial markets shock -- is at work here. 
However, our formal tests of the overidentifying restrictions are 
basically uninformative. They neither confirm or deny our identification 
of the shocks. Our confidence in the identification of the three shocks has 
to ride largely on our a priori belief in the long run restrictions that were 
used to identify the VARs in the first place. 
V. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION OF THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Using quarterly data from 1970 to 1985, we looked at bilateral 
relationships between Germany and six other European countries -­
Austria, the Netherlands, France, Italy, Spain and the UK; we also looked 
at bilateral relationships between a core (composed of Germany, Austria 
and the Netherlands) and four periphery countries -- France, Italy, Spain 
and the UK. To do this, we estimated a 2-variable V AR that was general 
and parsimonious, and a 3-variable VAR that was designed to capture the 
shocks defined by the Mundell-Flemming model. 
The 2-variable VARs told much the same story as the 3-variable 
V ARs for the bilateral relationships with the core. They showed that the 
money and financial markets shock explains less than 10% of the short run 
variation in relative national outputs; in many cases, it was less than 5%. 
On the other hand, the money and financial markets shock explained 70-
80% of the variation in the nominal exchange rates at those horizons; in 
most cases it was more than 75%. Italy was the only exception to this; for 
Italy, the shocks that explained most of the relative output movements also 
explained close to half of the variation in exchange rates. Supply shocks 
alone accounted for about 85% of the variation in relative output, but 
(excluding Italy) they accounted for less than 20% of the variation in 
exchange rates. 
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In summary, for our sample period from 1970 to 1985, we give a 
negative answer to Question 1 (with the possible exception of Italy): the 
shocks that caused international macroeconomic imbalances do not seem to 
have been the shocks that were moving nominal exchange rates. And we 
also give a negative answer to Question 2: the shocks that would be 
eliminated by joining a currency union do not seem to have been an 
important source of international macroeconomic imbalances. 
These results lend support to what we have called the Asset Price 
Hypothesis: during our sample period from 1970 - 1985, nominal exchange 
rates seem to have been acting as asset market prices, responding to 
financial market pressures that did not ultimately lead to macroeconomic 
imbalances; they do not seem to have been shock absorbers for goods 
market disturbances. If this interpretation is correct, then our results 
probably understate the importance of financial market shocks in exchange 
rate determination today, since free capital mobility was established in 
Europe well after 1985. In any case, it seems hard to argue (except 
possibly in the case of Italy) that exchange rates have moved to correct 
international macroeconomic imbalances in Europe. 
If however one distrusts our identification of the money and 
financial markets shock in the 3-variable system, then a less sanguine 
interpretation is possible. A critic of EMU might argue that what we call 
the money and financial market shock, EfJ is actually an aggregate demand 
shock, and that exchange rates have been so successful at absorbing 
these shocks that they have not passed on to destabilize relative outputs. 
This is an extreme interpretation of our results, and we find it rather 
implausible. 
Our work in this paper complements a growing empirical literature 
that has tried to document the potential costs of EMU. This literature -­
as exemplified by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993). De Grauwe and 
Vanhaverbeke (1993). and Ballabriga et al. (1995). and von Hagen and 
Neumann (1994) -- finds large asymmetric shocks and volatile real 
exchange rate movements across the countries of Europe. Given the 
sluggish nature of price levels, the implication would seem to be that 
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flexible nominal exchange rates are needed to achieve the real exchange 
rate adjustments that smooth national macroeconomic imbalances. 
We think our results are consistent with the earlier findings, but 
they have a very different implication. We have argued that it is hard to 
relate nominal exchange rate movements to the shocks that cause national 
macroeconomic imbalances. What then is the source of the real exchange 
rate volatility that has been observed by others? Our results suggest to 
us that the real exchange rate volatility has been caused by volatility in 
nominal exchange rates, which have been acting like asset market prices, 
and responding to shocks in money and financial markets. Under this 
interpretation, the bulk of the real exchange rate movements has been 
exogenous to the goods market; and fortunately, our results suggest that 
this real exchange rate volatility has not gone on to create additional 
macroeconomic imbalances. 
Our results are also consistent with a number of recent empirical 
studies. A large body of work -- exemplified by Baxter and Stockman 
(1989). European Commission (1990). Erkel-Rousse and Melitz (1995). 
Flood and Rose (1995). Rose (1995). Gras (1996). and Vinals and Jimeno 
(1996) -- finds little evidence to suggest that moving from a floating rate 
regime to a fixed rate regime would worsen real macroeconomic 
performance; in fact, some of these studies find no discernable effect on 
macroeconomic variables of switches in the exchange rate regime. Kim and 
Roubini (1995) use a VAR with contemporaneous restrictions, and find that 
monetary policy shocks are of relatively little importance in explaining the 
output movements of G-7 countries. Canova and Di Nocol6 (1995) employ 
large VARs to explain the movements of a variety of real and financial 
variables; they report that movements in exchange rates are explained 
almost entirely by their own innovations. 
Our results do appear to differ substantially from those of Clarida 
and Gali (1994). Using V AR techniques that are similar to our own, Clarida 
and Gali find (in some cases anyway) that aggregate demand shocks 
explain much more of the variation in real exchange rates than do money 
and financial market shocks. Clarida and Gali put different variables in 
their V AR, they look at different countries than we do, and they use 
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different long run restrictions to identify their shocks. 15 Still, we find the 
disparity in results discomforting .  
V I .  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
As the time for making decisions on EMU draws near, much of the 
discussion -- in both academic and political circles -- has focused on the 
potential costs of losing the exchange rate and national monetary policies 
as tools of macroeconomic stabilization . So far, most of the empirical work 
on the issue has gone into documenting the existence of asymmetric shocks 
(which are thought to cause macroeconomic imbalances) and the existence 
of large real exchange rate movements (which are thought to be needed to 
address the imbalances). The general conclusion has been that a small 
union centered around Germany (including the Benelux countries and 
possib •.• France) might be viable, but that a wider union would probably 
be too cos Uy . 
Our main conclusion for policy is that larger unions may also be 
viable. Starting with a small union composed of Germany, Austria and the 
Netherlands, we showed the stabilization efforts of France, Spain, or the 
UK would not be much affected by a loss of the exchange rate tool if those 
three countries were to be also part of the union. Aggregate supply and 
(non-monetary) demand shocks explain over 90% of the variation in relative 
output between these countries and the "core", but these shocks explain 
only about 25% of the variation in exchange rates. The exchange rate 
seems to be acting- more like an asset price than the "shock absorber" 
described by the literature on optimal currency areas . Moreover, the 
money and financial market shocks explain less than 10% of the variation 
iIi relative output. When we expanded the union to include France, we got 
much the same answer . Spain and the UK could join the union at low cost. 
We also looked at Italy, and it seems to be a border line case. 
Aggregate supply and (non-monetary) demand shocks explain at least 95% 
of the variation in Italyts output relative to either definition of the core, 
but these shocks also explain about 40% of the variation in its nominal 
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exchange rate. Even in the case of Italy, we suspect that the cost of EMU 
would be small. 
Two final comments should be made about our analysis. The first 
suggests that our results, if anything, understate the role of financial 
shocks in moving exchange rates. We looked at data from 1970 to 1985, 
because we wanted to a period in which exchange rates could reasonably 
be described as flexible. However, this was also a period in which capital 
flows were much more restricted than they are now. If our interpretation 
of the data is correct, we should expect to see exchange rates act even 
more like asset prices in the future. The second comment suggests 
caution. We have looked at "average" shocks and their effect on the 
stabilization effort. It lIright be argued that flexible exchange rates are 
needed for the big shocks that come, say, once a decade. Our methodology 
is obviously not well suited to analyze this question. 
All in all, however, we conclude that exchange rates do not seem to 
have played the "shock absorber" role that the literature on optimal 
currency areas suggests, nor do they seem likely to in the future. While 
assessing the overall desirability of EMU is a very complex issue which 
involves an evaluation of both costs and benefits, the costs of EMU appear 
to us to have been exaggerated. 
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ENDNOTES : 
1 .  Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) provide a nice survey of the 
literature. 
2 .  See for example Polo (1990), Eichengreen (1990), De Grauwe and 
Vanhaverbeke (1991), and von Hagen and Neumann (1994). 
3. For example, the lower variability typically found in US regional 
relative prices may be due to smaller asymmetric shocks, or it may be due 
to the higher labor mObility and the faster adjustment of real wages that 
also characterize the US economy. 
4 .  See also Cohen and Wyplosz (1988) and Ballabriga, Sebastian, and 
Valles (1995). 
5. Erkel-Rousse and Melitz (1995) is a notable exception. Erkel-Rousse 
and Melitz extend the VARs of Bayoumi and Eichengreen, trying to 
identify monetary and fiscal policy shocks . They argue that monetary 
shocks go primarily to prices in Europe, and not to quantities. Thus, they 
conclude J little would be lost by adopting a common currency. There has 
also . been some experimentation with large structural models. See for 
example Minford, Rastogi, and Hughes Hallet (1993) for a much less 
sanguine assessment of EMU. 
6. These are the implications of the Mundell-Flemming model; they come 
from a literature that parallels the "Poole" literature (on whether it is 
better to fix a nominal interest rate or a monetary aggregate). Buiter 
(1995) is a recent example. 
7 .  There is of course a substantial literature that has failed to link the 
nominal exchange rate to economic fundamentals at horizons of one or two 
years, and one might interpret this literature as having already rendered 
a verdict on the issue. We will discuss how our work relates to the wider 
empirical literature in a later section. 
8. The use of sticky price models has of course been questioned, on both 
theoretical and empirical grounds. We are not taking a stand on that issue 
here. The Mundell-Flemming model is necessarily a maintained hypothesis 
in the present paper; if we simply dismiss the Mundell-Flemming model (on 
either logical or empirical grounds) , then there is no basis for the optimal 
currency areas argument, or the potential costs of EMU that it identifies. 
9. We also checked for cointegrating vectors. In no case could we reject 
the null of no cointegration at the 10% level using the Johansen (1991) 
maximum likelihood procedure. We performed the cointegration tests with 
two lags and allowed for an intercept in the cointegrating relationship and 
a deterministic trend in levels. 
10. In some cases, results depend on parameter restrictions; see Clarida 
and Gali (1994). We simply state what are usualJy taken to be the 
implications of this well known model. 
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11. Once again, we require stationarity in the variables that go into the 
VAR. Standard stationarity tests (Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron) 
support our use of first differences . We also could not reject the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration at the 10% significance level for all the 
countries except in Spain using Johansen's (1991) maximum likelihood 
procedure. We performed the cointegration tests in the system [Ay, Ag, 
Ae] with two lags and allowing for an intercept in the cointegration relation 
and a deterministic trend in levels. In the Spanish case we could not reject 
the null of no cointegration at the 5% significance level when we included 
in the above specification a trend in the cointegration relation . 
12. With the other two systems -- [<1e" <1p" <1y,] ' and [<1e" <1v" <1y,] ' -- we 
had problems with the short run overidentifying restrictions, and the 
variance decompositions were implausible for some countries. For 
example , Er explained 40-50% of the variation of relative output in the cases 
of the UK and Spain (vis-a-vis Germany); nowhere in the literature , 
published or unpublished, have we been able to find comparable results 
for monetary disturbances . 
13. If we were able to disentangle relative monetary shocks into relative 
money supply shocks and relative money demand shocks, we would expect 
the sum of those two shocks to be more important in explaining relative 
output. We would expect the same result if monetary shocks could affect 
in the long run public consumption through the intertemporal government 
budget constraint. 
14. We are of course limiting our definition of the core to countries that are 
in our data set. 
15. Their VAR consists of : relative national output , relative price levels, 
and the real exchange rate. Their long run identifying restrictions are : 
money/financial market shocks have no long run effect on relative output 
or the real exchange rate, and aggregate demand shocks have no long run 
effect on relative output . All of their bilateral relationships are with the 
US. 
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cUqa ., �I �1ioIa (AJ.) MId dlMf:tS ill. the ........ eKllup "* (At,). 
III eadI coIII'-li we praml lllt petU'lltII&t of the variaII« deaNa.poIitioa. iIr die kveI of relative o.tpal d.e to En Ea 
.. 
d 
Eo Doc:ks. III paftlltbHis is the estiaated studard dniadoa tomp.ted from Moate CU'1o simaJatioas. 
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T_ . 
SOURCES OF FUJCTUATIONS FOR NOMINAL EXCDANGE RATJ:S 
AUSIlUA No:ruERLANDS FRANC< 
<, .. <. <, <, � <, .. < • 
Forecast Step 
".2 5.3 5.' 133 20.9 5.6 7M '.7 185 
(8.9) (7.1) (6.2) (12.6) (11.8) (S.O) (14.9) (6..5) (14.5) 
85.7 7.3 6.' 72A 20.6 U 74.0 55 20.4 
(10.4) (S.8) (7.0) (12.2) (11.0) (8.5) (15.4) (7.3) (14.8) 
• 77.\ 10.1 12.6 66.' 20.1 13.0 70.9 '.2 20.7 
(12.4) (IDA) (10.0) (11.8) (10.0) (8.2) (15.3) (9.3) (14.9) 
71.3 11.0 175 ".7 19.4 15.8 .... 15.9 19.9 
(14.1) (10.8) (12.8) (12.5) (10.3) (10.5) (lS.4) (12.2) (14.5) 
".\ 11.0 19.8 .... J9.4 16.1 59.\ 215 19.3 
(153) (10.9) (14.4) (13.5) (10.9) (1I.J) (16.0) (14.6) (14.5) 
20 ".2 10.6 23.\ ".\ 18.4 17.4 50.0 28.2 21.6 
(18.2) (11.8) (17.3) (16.3) (13.0) (14,5) (18.3) (18.9) (16.7) 
ITALY SPAIN UK 
<, .. � <, " � " .. " 
Forecast Step 
.... 12.7 27.1 90,4 ••• .. , 7,. 10.8 12.3 
(17.0) (13.2) (18.3) 00.5) (1.3) ,U, (20.0) (11.8) (16.6) 
57.4 13.2 29.2 ... 6.' 5.' 75.7 9.' 14.4 
(17.7) (13.4) (19.0) (10.2) (7.0) (7.1) (19.r, (10.3) (17.8) 
• 53.8 11.9 34.2 81.4 '.7 ••• 67.7 ••  23.3 
(17.5) (11.8) (19.7) (13.1) (9.2) (10.3) (20.6) (B.6) (20.3) 
, 53.B 115 36.6 ".1 \&6 12.2 685 ••• 21.6 
(18.0) (11.6) (20.1) (14.9) (12.3) (13.1) (19.6) (7.6) (20.3) 
• 53.4 11.6 34.' 63.3 '" 14.7 ".2 \03 20.4 
(18.6) (12.0) (20.B) (15.0) (l2.B) (15.1) (19.4) (B.4) (20.4) 
20 52.3 12.1 35.4 58.' 25.' 15.3 .... 11.4 18.7 
(26.4) (13.5) (23.4) (17.8) (14.6) (17.7) (21.0) (11.9) (21.4) 
Notes: 
De sample period is 1970:1 - 1985:4. The VAR includes a constant and four lags of chaDge5 ill relative output (AYJ 
chaDges in government consumption {Ag.> aDd changes in tbe nominal uchan� rate {AeJ. 
In eacb column we present the percentage or the vuia.nce decomposition for the Jevel of eJ:chan� rates due to e., � and 
Eo sIIocks. In parenthesis is ·the estimated standard deviation computed from Monte Cario simulations. 
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T_ , 
SOURCLS OF n.ucruAllONS (RD.ATIVI: TO CORE 1) 
RELATIVE ourrtrr 
FRANCE SPAIN UK ITAI.Y 
" " � <, .. � <, .. " " .. " 
Foucast Sltp 
1 4.' '.4 ...  1 13 " 83.0 '.4 ••• 82.6 10.1 22.7 67.1 
(7.8) (Ill) (15.1) (10.5) (a.o) (11.8) (10.8) (12.9) (16.2) (105) (20.1) (21.0) 
5.' " ".4 10.8 5.0 84.1 7.' 7.4 84.' 65 16.0 nA 
(6.8) (9.8) 03.3) (9.5) (3.9) (10.7) (9.3) (11.3) (14.4) (6.1) (IS.I) (15.6) 
4 4.2 5.' .... '.0 '.2 .... '.1 63 875 4.4 10.7 84.7 
(6.0) (7.7) {I 1.7) (6.9) (3.6) (7.8) (6.2) (9.5) (11.4) (3.9) (9.1) (10.4) 
• ,.\ 45 92.2: ... 2A 92.7 5.0 53 895 '5 " ." 
(5.1) (U, (10.8) (4.1) (2.2) (4.9) (4.5) (7.2) (8.7) (3.2) (7.0) (7.6) 
• 2A '.7 93.7 " 1.8 .... 4.0 45 \11.4 ,. 63 90.7 
(45) (6.4) (10.1) (2.8) (1.6) (l.4) (3.4) (5.8) (7.0) (1.6) (5.3) (5.1l) 
20 1.2 1.8 96.8 1.1 0.' 98.1 1.8 2.4 9S.' 1.2 2.4 96.2 
(3.9) (5.1, (8.9) (1.1) (0.6) (1.4) (1.7) (4.1, (4.8) (1.1) (1.1) (2.5) 
NOMJ]IfAl. EXCllANGI: RA 1'1: 
FRANC< 'SPAIN UK ITAI,l' 
" .. " " .. � � .. " <, .. � 
I'oreust Sltp 
81.0 11.7 7.1 86.7 5.7 75 80.4 10.8 .7 66.4 4.' 2., 
(B .• ) (10.6) (9.3) (11.4) (7.7) (7.9) (16.3) (12.6) (12.8) (19.9) (.0, (19.4) 
".0 11.6 " 835 .. • •• 7M 1 13 10.1 6U 5.' 31.4 
(14.1) (11.2) (10.0) (12.9) (7.9) (9.7) (16.9) (12.5) (14.4) (20.B) (8.8) (20.4) 
BI.6 7.9 \03 81.2 7.7 11.0 75' 11.0 13.7 593 .. ,,� 
(12.4) (7.1) (10.9) (11.9) « n  (10.3) (18.2) (11.3) (11.2) (21.0) (9.2) (20.8) 
75.6 '.7 15.6 75.7 12.4 'U 75.6 10.2 14.0 5U 7.3 345 
(12.7) (6.1) (13.5) (13.0) (9.3) (11.1) (17.2) (10.0) (16.5) (20.5) (9.2) (20.1) 
• . 70.9 '.4 195 72.9 13.6 IH 75.0 10.4 14.4 57.8 75 l4.' 
(14.5) (7.1) (15.8) (14.4) (10.6) (12.5) (I7J) (10.1) (16.8) (20.4) (9.5) (20.0) 
20 64.0 ••• 26.2 "3 13.6 17.0 74.1 \05 15.2 56.1) 0.2 "5 
(19.7) ('.5) (21.0) (17.9) (12.4) (16.8) (19.1) (12.0) (18.1) (21.2) (10.4) (21.3) 
Notes: 
Core I is funned by Gumany. Austria aDd tht Ntthtrlaads. 
See NOI" in Tabie 4. 
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T_ , 
SOVRCI:S ()II' JWCI1JATlONS (RDATIV& TO COllI Z) 
RDAT1VJ: ourrt1T 
SPAIN UK rrALY 
<, .. < " .. " " " " 
Forec:ut SWp 
105 15 Il.. 7.' It.7 113 10.1 '" "'. 
(1I.5) (7.7) (IUl (10.1) (11.4) 04.1) (11.1) (11.9) flU) 
, ••• , .• ".7 U .. au 75 16.1 ,., 
(10.3) (6.9) (11.0) (1.2) (93) (IH) (U) (14.6) (16.2) 
• 73 ,. "'7 '.7 .. 87.l , .. 10.1 1<7 
(7.4) ('.5) (U) (S.7) (7.4) (9.3) (5.3) (10.1) (11.5) 
• " �. 9L7 ••• , .• ".1 J.S 7.' ".7 
C •• I) (3.') ('.5) (4A) (5.5) (7.1) (3.9) (7.4) (U) 
• L9 U .... U ••• .... J.' ,� '�I 
(�7) (U) (3.9) (3.1) ('.2) (5.7) (3.I) (5.1) (6.1) 
" I.' ••• 911 LI , .  955 U �I .65 
(1.1) (1.0) (1.8) (1.9) (U) (3.0) (1.3) (2.0) (25) 
NOMIl'(AL EXCIIANGE RATE 
SPAIN UK ITALY 
< .. < < .. < < .. < 
Forecast ,Step 
I ... , .• LI IU 10> ••  .... • •• 27.2 
(11.0 (U) (10.0) (11.2) (14.6) (11.7) (19.8) (1.5) (19.3) 
1 11.. 7l 10.0 .. , 10.0 ••• .. .. 7.' Jll 
(11.6) (7.2) (10.6) (17.1) (13.6) (11.0) (19.7) ('.6) (19� 
. ' .... " 13.0 ,.. fA III 53.7 " '" 
(12.4) (S •• � (11.7) (17.6) (11.1) (11.9) (1906) (93) (".4) 
• ,., L7 15.0 7 .. 10.7 I� 53l 10.0 ". 
(13.5) (5.0) (13.9) (16.6) (11.3) (13.1) (19.5) (9,7) (20.4) 
S ' •• 1 ••• IU 76l 113 123 51.2 10.1 37.4 
(14.2) (6.0) (14.7) (16.3) (12.2) (11.9) (19.7) (9.') (10.7) 
" n. ;A ILl 75.7 I�' I�I ." 10.9 39.7 
(11.5) (1.5) (11.5) (17.3) (12.1) (13.1) (11..5) (10.7) (l2.5) 
Notes: 
Cort 1 is fonacd. by Genaaay, Aulhia. The Netber .... d. aad FraMe. 
Set Nota ill Table 4. 
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T_ 7 
SOl1RCIS or fU.ICJ11Al1ONS (R&LA11V& TO CORE l) 
..... 11VK ourrur 
UK [TALY 
" .. � " .. � 
FOftUIt SItp 
10.8 .. , 79. 'J .... 62. 
(16.1) (13.7) (21.8) (12.2) (IU) (23.4) 
'.7 U 81.9 7.1 19.0 73A 
(14.2) (115) (19.8) (10.4) (15.4) (19.2) 
4 7.' .. " .  4.7 lUi "., 
(11.0) (I.� (15.1) (7.1) (10.9) (11.9) 
• ., .J A5 ,. SA .U 
(15) (03) (11.1) (4.9) (1.4) (10.3) 
• 4.' 4A .... 1.7 65 90.7 
(6.0') (5.1) ('.2) (1.6) (U) (1.2) 
20 �I 2.1 95.7 1.0 13 ... 
(3.0) (2.4) (404) (1.3) (13) (�I) 
NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE 
UK [TALY 
.. .. • .. .. � 
Foncut Sttp 
I �I '.7 1l.1 ... ••• 21 .. 
(11.8) (10.0) (15.7) (11.4) (7.6) (21.0) 
80.7 .. 12.6 57.4 15 34.0 
(11.7) (10,0) (15.1) (11.3) (OJ) (21.5) 
4 "'. .. 15' 465 1.0 41J 
(15.7) (105) (16.1) (10.1) (to.1) (21A) 
, 73J 10.1 I6A " .• 13.7 40.7 
(11.8) (115) (17.2) (19.1) (11.7) (21:4) 
• 7IA IIA 17.0 432 14.7 41' 
(10.0) (12.5) (�I.l) (19.2) (11.1) (22J) 
20 615 IlA 173 315 103 ".1 
(23.4) (14.7) (21.0) (10.6) (14.7) (24.7) 
Notes: 
COR 3 .. iwmcd by Gena_y, AUSCria, 11Ie Ndltertaa4l, Frana ad Spain. 
See Nottl in Table 4. 
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Figure 1 
Nominal Exchange Rate Responses to a Neutral Shock 
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Note: Estimated nominal exchange rate responses to a neutral shock (eJ. Average 
responses and two· standard deviation band are calculated from a Monte Carlo 
experiment. 
- 38 -
Figure 2 
Nominal Exchange Rate Responses to a Non·neutral Shock 
: 1 
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Note: . Estimated nominal exchange rate responses to a non-neutral shock (EJ. Average 
responses and two .... standard deviation band are calculated from a Monte Carlo 
experiment. 
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Figure 3 
Output Responses to a Neutral Shock :: 1 ' - - -
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Note: Estimated output responses to a neutral shock (E.). Average responses and 
two-standard deviation band are calculated from a Monte Carlo experiment. 
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Figure 4 
Output Responses to a NOD-neutral Shock 
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Note: Estimated output responses to a non-neutral shock {eJ. Average respo� and 
two-standard deviation band are calculated from a Monte Carlo experiment 
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Figure 5 
Nominal Exchange Rate Responses to a Money and Financial Shock 
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Note: Estimated nominal exchange rate responses to a money and financial shock (Er)' 
Average responses and two-standard deviation band are calculated from a Monte 
Carlo experiment. 
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Figure 6 
Nominal Excbange Rate Responses to an Aggregate Demand Shock 
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Note: Estimated nominal exchange rate responses to an aggregate demand shock (eJ. 
Average responses and two-standard deviation band are calculated from a Monte 
Carlo experiment. 
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Figure 7 
Nominal Excbange Rate Responses to an Aggregate Supply Shock 
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Note: Estimated nominal exchange rate responses to an aggregate supply shock (E,). 
Average responses and two-standard deviation band are calculated from a Monte 
Carlo experiment 
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Figure 8 
Output Responses to a Money and Finaocial Sbock 
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Note: Estimated output responses to a money and fmancial shock (Er)' Average 
responses and two-standard deviation band are calcula1ed from a Monte Carlo 
experiment. 
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Figure 9 
Output Responses to an Aggregate Demand Shock 
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Note: Estimated output responses to an aggregate demand shock (Eo). Average 
responses and two-standard deviation band are calculated from a Monte Carlo 
experiment. 
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Figure 10 
Output Responses to an Aggregate Supply Shock 
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Note: Estimated output responses to an aggregate supply shock (e.). Average responses 
and two-standard deviation band are calculated from a Monte Carlo experiment. 
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